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Abstract
Recent work shows that we can use partial verification instead
of money to implement truthful mechanisms. In this paper we
develop tools to answer the following question. Given an al-
location rule that can be made truthful with payments, what
is the minimal verification needed to make it truthful without
them? Our techniques leverage the geometric relationship be-
tween the type space and the set of possible allocations.
Introduction
Mechanism design studies how to realize desirable out-
comes to optimization problems in settings with self-
interested agents. The most common tool to achieve desir-
able outcomes is the use of payments, and there is a large
literature focusing on the following question. Given an allo-
cation rule, which specifies the outcome that should be se-
lected given the types of the agents, do there exist payments
to turn it into an incentive compatible mechanism (to im-
plement it) (Guesnerie and Laffont 1984; Saks and Yu 2005;
Ashlagi et al. 2010; Frongillo and Kash 2014)?
Recent work has identified partial verification as a use-
ful alternative to money to implement incentive compatible
mechanisms. The idea is that the mechanism designer can
detect some possible agent misreports, either by preventing
them outright, or by penalizing the agent (e.g., by exclud-
ing her from the market). The power of partial verification is
that the mechanism designer need not provide agents with
incentives for a subset of the possible types they can re-
port if verification of these types is in place. An example
of such a partial verification is agents not being able to re-
port a higher valuation for any assignment than is true. They
are free, however, to report a lower value.
This specific type of verification has been adopted by Fo-
takis, Krysta and Ventre (2014). They consider the case in
which a government is auctioning business licenses for cities
under its administration, and companies want to get a license
for some subset of cities to sell their stock of goods to the
market. The verification assumption is that the government,
that acts as auctioneer, can verify if the winner actually has
sufficient goods in stock and thus prevent overbidding. In a
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particularly suggestive result, they showed that this verifica-
tion suffices to implement all allocation rules that are imple-
mentable with money in single-minded combinatorial auc-
tions. (In fact they show that a weaker verification, where the
agent cannot overbid only on the bundle received, suffices.)
Interestingly, this verification no longer suffices for agents
who are k-minded, k ≥ 2. Other work in the literature (see
Related Work) has focused on specific scenarios like facility
location and combinatorial auctions, and identifies the sets
of verification assumptions that guarantee incentive compat-
ibility of mechanisms.
Our work takes a different approach, in that we build
tools to understand the power of verification independent
of a specific scenario. In particular, we answer the follow-
ing question: given an allocation rule that can be made
truthful with payments, what is the minimal verification
needed to make it truthful without them? Essentially, sim-
ilar to (Ferraioli, Serafino, and Ventre 2016), we aim to in-
form the designer of the resources needed for verification.
In contrast to this work, which focuses on facility location,
we propose a geometric characterization of the verification
needed to use any implementable-with-payment allocation
rule in a scenario without transfers, while guaranteeing strat-
egyproofness.
We introduce the concept of the harmless set of types as
those which do not need to be verified for a given set of
single-agent allocation rules. Our basic building block is a
characterization of the structure of harmless sets for allo-
cation rules which only assign two possible allocations and
are implementable with payments. We then show how this
can be extended to characterize harmless sets for more gen-
eral sets of single-agent implementable-with-payments al-
location rules. Our focus on sets of rules derives from the
observation that multiagent allocation rules are, from the
perspective of a single agent, just a set of allocation rules
parameterized by the types of the other agents.
Our characterization highlights a split in the nature of
harmless sets of types for deterministic and randomized
mechanisms. Deterministic and universally truthful mech-
anisms both have large harmless sets of types, while in con-
trast the harmless set for truthful-in-expectationmechanisms
is quite restricted. Our results are constructive and provide
geometric insights for these findings.
The central contribution of our approach is its generality:
our analysis could in principle be applied to any mechanism
or class of mechanisms. Moreover, while our results are of-
ten stated for two allocations and single-agent settings, they
also apply directly to more than two allocations and multi-
agent settings, by standard arguments. We also examine two
extensions: allocation-dependent verification, a weaker form
of verification that can expand the harmless set of types, and
reverse verification, where the reported type of the agent is
considered when computing the types that needs to be veri-
fied. We conclude with examples showing how our approach
can be used in three application domains and how our results
replicate and extend existing results in the literature.
Related Work
Several works in both the economics and computer science
literatures focus on the design of incentive compatible
mechanisms with verification (Green and Laffont 1986;
Fotakis, Krysta, and Ventre 2015;
Fotakis and Zampetakis 2015; Penna and Ventre 2009;
Ventre 2014) to overcome the Gibbard-Satterthwaite im-
possibility result (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975) for
mechanisms without money.
In particular, given a mechanism, these works aim to
reduce the types agents can report to the ones that do
not bring benefit to them. This is done by either assum-
ing that the reportable type space varies depending on
the true type of the agents and that this is known to the
mechanism (Green and Laffont 1986) or that the mechanism
can verify part of the type space and penalize agents that
misreport in that space (Fotakis, Krysta, and Ventre 2014;
Ferraioli, Serafino, and Ventre 2016). In particular, given a
mechanism, these works aim to reduce the types agents can
report to the ones that do not bring benefit to them. This is
done by either assuming that the reportable type space varies
depending on the true type of the agents or that the mecha-
nism can verify part of the type space and penalize agents
that misreport in that space.
The power of verification in the design of mech-
anisms without money has been studied in a num-
ber of applications including scheduling of unre-
lated machines (Koutsoupias 2014), combinatorial
auctions (Krysta and Ventre 2015), and assignment
and allocation problems (Dughmi and Ghosh 2010;
Guo and Conitzer 2010). A particular focus has been
on the design of mechanisms with verification yielding
good approximate solutions to the problem of facil-
ity location on a line (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2009;
Serafino and Ventre 2016; Serafino and Ventre 2014;
Ferraioli, Serafino, and Ventre 2016). Among the work
that study the power of verification, several focused on
the case in which the mechanism is without money.
The design of mechanism without money has been
studied for different applications: from scheduling of
unrelated machine (Koutsoupias 2014) and combina-
torial auctions (Krysta and Ventre 2015) to assignment
and allocation problems (Dughmi and Ghosh 2010;
Guo and Conitzer 2010). Often, the focus has been on
the design of approximated mechanisms with the aim to
face situations in which optimal solutions do not exist. In
particular, the most considered problem is the one of facil-
ities location on a line (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2009;
Serafino and Ventre 2016; Serafino and Ventre 2014;
Ferraioli, Serafino, and Ventre 2016). Much of this literature
has focused on identifying verifications which seem natural
for a particular application and suffice to design useful
mechanisms (Koutsoupias 2014; Serafino and Ventre 2016;
Fotakis, Krysta, and Ventre 2014), in contrast to the present
work which fixes a set of allocation rules and asks what
verification would be minimally necessary to render the
mechanisms truthful. Most similarly to our own work,
Ferraioli et al. (2016) have considered the question the
minimum set of assumptions needed in the facility location
setting.
Preliminaries
In this section, we focus on mechanism design with a sin-
gle agent. Let S denote the set of assignments, one of which
the agent will receive, |S| = m. Let A denote the set of
allocations, where an allocation a ∈ A is a probability dis-
tribution over assignments. Formally, A ⊆ {a ∈ [0, 1]m :∑
s∈S a(s) = 1}. One can think of assignments as a set
of mutually exclusive outcomes, and allocations as distribu-
tions over these outcomes, which for example will be point
distributions when we consider deterministic mechanisms.
We use θ = [θs1 , θs2 , ..., θsm ] ∈ R
m to denote the type
of the agent, i.e., her private information, where θsi is the
agent’s value for the assignment si. The set of possible agent
types is denoted Θ ⊆ Rm. A single-agent direct revelation
mechanism is denoted M = {f, p}, where f : Θ → A
is the allocation rule and p : Θ → R is the payment rule.
Under this mechanism, the utility of an agent with type θ
who reports type θˆ is uM(θ, θˆ) = f(θˆ) · θ − p(θˆ).
We now introduce several terms and definitions which we
will use throughout the paper. Additionally, we summarize
in Table 1 the notation used in the paper which will be intro-
duced in the following sections.
Incentive Compatibility. A mechanism is incentive
compatible (i.e., truthful) if the agent is incentivized to com-
municate to the mechanism her true type. Since agents are
rational, to guarantee incentive compatibility, the mecha-
nism must guarantee that each agent is better off when
she reports her true type than when she misreports, i.e.,
uM(θ, θ) ≥ uM(θ, θˆ) for all θ, θˆ ∈ Θ.
Implementable-with-Payments Allocation Rule. An
allocation rule f is implementable-with-payments if there
exists a payment rule p such that the mechanism M =
{f, p} is incentive compatible.
Deterministic Mechanism. A mechanism is determin-
istic if each allocation a ∈ A selects one assignment with
probability 1 and all the other outcomes with probability
0, i.e., a(s) = 1, s ∈ S and a(s′) = 0, ∀s′ 6= s, s′ ∈
S, ∀a ∈ A. In this sense, all mechanisms, including deter-
ministic mechanisms, are randomized.
Universally Truthful Mechanism. We say an incentive
compatible randomized mechanism M = (f, p) is univer-
ally truthful if it is a distribution over incentive compatible
deterministic mechanisms. That is, there is a set of deter-
ministic incentive compatible mechanisms SM known as
the support ofM and a probability distribution α such that
fM =
∑
M′∈SM
αM′fM′ .
Truthful in Expectation Mechanism. If a randomized
mechanism is incentive compatible, we say that it is truth-
ful in expectation. (The expected value is implicit in the dot
product in the definition of uM(θ, θˆ).)
Truthful with VerificationMechanism. Let V ⊆ Θ×Θ
be the set of pairs (θ, θˆ) that the designer can verify and
denote with Mv = (f, V ) a mechanism with verification.
Mv is truthful if for all pairs of types (θ, θˆ) either f(θ) ·θ ≥
f(θˆ) ·θ or (θ, θˆ) ∈ V . Intuitively, either an agent with type θ
prefers not to report θˆ or the mechanism designer can detect
or prevent such a report.
Basics of Partial Verification
In this section, we develop our basic tools for reasoning
about what types do not need to be verified. In particular,
given a type θ, if the agent can never benefit by reporting
some other type θˆ, then from the perspective of the mech-
anism designer it is unnecessary to be able to verify (θ, θˆ),
i.e., verify that θˆ is not the agent’s true type. We call such
types harmless. 1
Definition 1. Given a type θ and allocation rule f , the
harmless set of types H(θ, f) is the set composed by the
types θˆ ∈ Θ such that f(θ) · θ ≥ f(θˆ) · θ.
We can also talk about the harmless set of types for multi-
ple allocation rules. This allows us to take our results about
the single agent setting and apply them to settings with mul-
tiple agents. We can turn the multiagent allocation rule into
a single agent allocation rule by “plugging in” the types of
the other agents. However, in doing so we end up with dif-
ferent allocation rules depending on the types of those other
agents. Thus, capturing a multiagent allocation rule in a sin-
gle agent setting requires a whole set of allocation rules (see
the Multi-Agent Mechanisms section).
As an added benefit, this generality allows us to talk about
not just single mechanisms, but whole families of mecha-
nisms. Later, we exploit this flexibility to draw a sharp con-
trast between the harmless set for all universally truthful
mechanisms and the harmless set for all truthful in expec-
tation mechanisms.
Definition 2. Let F be a set of allocation rules. Then the
harmless set of types H(θ, F ) is the set composed by the
types θˆ ∈ Θ such that f(θ) · θ ≥ f(θˆ) · θ for every f ∈ F .
1 To simplify the characterization, we focus on harmless types
instead of types that must be verified. Given a type θ and allocation
rule f , a pair (θ, θˆ) is in V if θˆ ∈ Θ \ H(θ, f). For brevity, we
say that the set of types which must be verified is Θ \ H(θ, f).
That is, the mechanism will be truthful as long as the mechanism
designer can verify that the agent does not have true type θ when
she reported θ′, for all θ′ ∈ Θ \H(θ, f).
Notation Definition
f Allocation rule
F Set of allocation rules
H(θ, f) Harmless set of types given true
type θ and allocation rule f
H(θ, F ) Harmless set of types given true
type θ and set of allocation rules F
f{ai,aj} Separating allocation rule
F¯{ai,aj} Set of separating allocation rules f{ai,aj}
F¯ Set of F¯{ai,aj}, ∀{ai, aj} ∈ A
lf,{ai,aj} Allocation hyperplane over {ai, aj}
I{ai,aj} Indifference hyperplane
L{ai,aj} Set of lf,{ai,aj} parallel to I{ai,aj}
fθ Critical allocation rule
lfθ,{ai,aj} Critical allocation hyperplane
F¯ θ Set of critical allocation rules
Lθ Set of critical allocation hyperplanes
Table 1: Notation used throughout the paper.
It is immediate from this definition that the harmless set
of types of a set of allocation rules is the intersection of
their individual harmless sets. This is because our definition
imposes a strong requirement for a type to be harmless: it
identifies a type as harmless only if it is harmless for every
allocation rule in the set. That is, there is no scenario un-
der which the agent can benefit from reporting a harmless
type. This strong definition is in the same spirit as the defi-
nition of incentive compatibility; we only want to declare a
type harmless if the mechanism designer never has to worry
about that type being reported.
Observation 1. The harmless set of types H(θ, F ) corre-
sponds to the intersection of the harmless set of types of ev-
ery allocation rule f ∈ F , i.e.,H(θ, F ) = ∩f∈FH(θ, f).
Using H(θ, F ), we can express the minimal verification
needed to guarantee that a implementable-with-payments
allocation rule is also truthful without them. In particular,
this minimal verification corresponds to the set V where
(θ, θˆ) ∈ V if and only if θˆ ∈ Θ \H(θ, f).
Harmless sets with two allocations (Informally)
We now introduce our main tools for understanding
the harmless sets of implementable-with-payments alloca-
tion rules. At first, we characterize the harmless sets of
implementable-with-payments allocation rules which have
exactly two allocations in their range, and then show that
there is a sense in which this captures everything we need
to know about the harmless set of types even when there are
more than two allocations. Before giving a formal treatment
of this setting, we walk through it more informally.
With only two allocations, incentive compatible mech-
anisms have a simple, well-known form. By the taxa-
tion principle, any incentive compatible mechanism con-
sists of assigning a price to each allocation and let-
ting the agent choose which allocation it prefers to pay
for (Guesnerie and Laffont 1984). Thus, if we call the two
allocations a1 and a2 and assign them prices p1 = p(a1)
and p2 = p(a2), an agent with type θ can be assigned
f(θ) = a1 by an incentive compatible mechanism only if
a1 · θ − p1 ≥ a2 · θ − p2 (and similarly for a2). Rewrit-
ing, it is easy to see that the types that are indifferent and
could be assigned either allocation are those who satisfy
(a1 − a2) · θ = p1 − p2. That is, these types all lie on a
hyperplane. Further, the two half spaces on either side of
this hyperplane correspond to the sets of types that prefer
each allocation at the given prices, i.e., if θ is in the interior
of one halfspace and θ′ is in the interior of the other then
uM(θ, θ) > uM(θ, θ′) and uM(θ′, θ′) > uM(θ′, θ).
Since such a hyperplane is uniquely identified by a rela-
tive price c = p1 − p2, every implementable-with-payments
allocation rule f can be associated with the hyperplane
(a1 − a2) · θ = c for some real number c. Note however,
that there will in general be many allocation rules associated
with a single hyperplane because types on the hyperplane
are indifferent between the allocations whose prices differ-
ence is c and so can be assigned to either allocation by an
implementable-with-payments allocation rule.
Now consider a particular such f and a type θ. There are
five possible cases forH(θ, f).
Case 1: θ ·a1 > θ ·a2 and f(θ) = a1. An agent with type
θ is already receiving her preferred outcome, so the agent
cannot gain by reporting another type. ThusH(θ, f) = Θ.
Case 2: θ ·a1 > θ ·a2 and f(θ) = a2. An agent with type
θ can benefit by reporting any type θ′ such that f(θ′) = a1,
so H(θ, f) = Θ − {θ′ : f(θ′) = a1}. By the above analy-
sis, H(θ, f) contains all types on the side of the hyperplane
associated with f where types prefer a2 at relative price c
implied by f . It may also contain some types on the hyper-
plane, if f happens to assign them a2.
Case 3: θ · a1 = θ · a2. This case is degenerate and the
agent with type θ is totally indifferent between the two allo-
cations, soH(θ, f) = Θ regardless of the f chosen.
Cases 4 and 5: symmetric to Cases 1 and 2.
So what does H(θ, F ) look like where F is the set of all
such f? By Observation 1, we need to take the intersection
of the harmless sets. In the degenerate case 3, this yields
H(θ, F ) = Θ. Otherwise, all that matters is the f for which
case 2 applies. That is we care about the f which correspond
to hyperplanes with c such that (a1 − a2) · θ ≤ c. The in-
tersection of the harmless sets of all these hyperplanes is the
set of θ′ which are “below” all of them. This is entirely de-
termined by the “lowest” such hyperplane, the one where
(a1 − a2) · θ = c. Consider the following example.
Example 1. Consider the case of a deterministic incentive
compatible mechanism with two possible assignments, s1
and s2, and two allocations, a1 and a2, such that a1(s1) = 1
and a2(s2) = 1, i.e., allocation a1 assigns s1 to the agent
with probability 1, while allocation a2 assigns s2 with prob-
ability 1. Furthermore, assume that the agent’s type is θ =
(θs1 , θs2) with θs1 < θs2 . This setting is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1 (a), where θ1 = θs1 and θ2 = θs2 .
The hyperplane of types θ′ ∈ Θ for which θ′s1 = θ
′
s2
is
the 45 degree line from the origin, and which we refer to
as the indifference hyperplane. Note that it corresponds to
taking c = 0, and that changing c just translates this line
while keeping it at 45 degrees. The translations of this line
for which (a1 − a2) · θ ≥ c, i.e., θs1 − θs2 ≥ c, are the
lines that in the figure would be above θ; the lowest of these
is the one which passes through θ, which we refer to as the
critical allocation hyperplane. The harmless set H(θ, F ) is
the set of types below this critical allocation hyperplane. It
corresponds to the types that prefer s1 relative to s2 more
strongly that θ. That is, those θ′ where θs1−θs2 < θ
′
s1
−θ′s2 .
Formal treatment of two allocations
We define the concepts introduced in the previous section
and formally prove how to identify the harmless set of types
of implementable-with-payments allocation rules. We start
by defining a separating allocation rule i.e., an allocation
rule that can be associated with a hyperplane that divides
the space in two half spaces such that all the types in one
half space receive the same allocation, and a set of such al-
locations.
Definition 3. An allocation rule f{ai,aj} is separating if
f{ai,aj} : Θ → {ai, aj} ⊆ A and there exists a hyperplane
which separates the type space Θ in two open half-spaces
Θ′,Θ′′ ⊆ Θ such that the closure of their union is Θ and
if θ ∈ Θ′ thenf(θ) = ai while if θ ∈ Θ
′′ then f(θ) = aj .
(For brevity, when the allocation pair {ai, aj} is clear from
context we suppress it and simply write f .)2
Definition 4. Let F¯{ai,aj} denote the set of separating allo-
cation rules f{ai,aj}. Then let F¯ = ∪{ai,aj}⊆AF¯{ai,aj}.
Given a separating allocation rule, we are interested in the
hyperplane it induces, in the following sense.
Definition 5. The allocation hyperplane lf,A′ over alloca-
tion set A′ = {ai, aj} is the hyperplane that separates the
two half-spaces identified by the separating allocation rule
f ∈ F¯{ai,aj}. In the remaining of the paper, we will say that
lf,A′ is induced by the allocation rule f ∈ F¯{ai,aj}.
Of course, selecting two allocations and a hyperplane is
not sufficient for an allocation rule to be implementable-
with-payments. By the taxation principle, the hyperplane
must consist of all the types which are indifferent between
the two allocations at a particular price. Further, the remain-
ing types must receive the “correct” allocation. That is, those
which would be willing to pay more than the price to get
one allocation instead of the other are the ones that receive
it. Such hyperplanes are exactly those parallel to the hyper-
plane of types indifferent between the two allocations. We
capture these requirements in the following definitions.
Definition 6. Given {ai, aj} ⊆ A, the indifference hyper-
plane I{ai,aj} is the hyperplane composed of types where the
agent is indifferent between allocation ai and allocation aj ,
i.e. all the points θ′ ∈ Θ where ai · θ′ = aj · θ′.
2Note that any implementable-with-payment allocation rule is
also a separating allocation rule.
Definition 7. Let L{ai,aj} be the set of allocation hyper-
planes lf,{ai,aj} parallel to indifference hyperplane I{ai,aj}.
The following observation formally summarizes the pre-
ceding discussion by showing that the hyperplanes in the
set L{ai,aj} are only the ones that are induced by an
implementable-with-payments allocation rules given the al-
locations {ai, aj}, and thus that the implementable-with-
payments allocation rules are separating allocation rules.
Observation 2. A hyperplane is in L{ai,aj} if and only if
it is induced by an implementable-with-payments allocation
rule f ∈ F¯{ai,aj}.
Proof. First, note that if lf,{ai,aj} = I{ai′ ,aj′} and the pay-
ment is equal to zero, then the agent has no incentive to
misreport her type, i.e., the mechanism M = (f, 0) is in-
centive compatible. Second, we know that, from the taxa-
tion principle, an allocation rule f ∈ F¯{ai,aj} is truthfully
implementable-with-payments in dominant strategies if the
agent is charged the same payment every time she receives
a given assignment. Equivalently, 3 the allocation hyper-
plane lf,{ai,aj} of an implementable-with-payments alloca-
tion rule f ∈ F¯{ai,aj} is parallel to the related indifference
hyperplane I{ai,aj}.
While there are many allocation hyperplanes in L{ai,aj},
the harmless set is entirely determined by one of them, the
one identified as the ”lowest” in the previous section, which
we term the critical allocation hyperplane.
Definition 8. The critical allocation hyperplane
lfθ,{ai,aj} ∈ L{ai,aj} is parallel to the indifference
hyperplane I{ai,aj} and the agent’s type belongs to it (i.e.,
θ ∈ lfθ,{ai,aj}). We call a rule f
θ ∈ F¯{ai,aj} that induces
lfθ,{ai,aj} a critical allocation rule.
Note that there exist an infinite number of critical alloca-
tion rules that induce a critical allocation hyperplane. In the
remaining of the paper, the critical allocation rule we con-
sider is the following: if θ′ ∈ lfθ,{ai,aj} and ai · θ
′ > aj · θ′,
then fθ(θ′) = ai but f
θ(θ) = aj . I.e., θ gets its less pre-
ferred allocation, while all the other types on the critical al-
location hyperplane get the more preferred allocation. This
implies that θ′ /∈ H(θ, F¯ ), ∀θ′ 6= θ ∈ lfθ,{ai,aj}.
Lemma 1. H(θ, F¯{ai,aj}) = H(θ, f
θ), i.e., the harmless
set of types of the set of rules F¯{ai,aj} is equal to the harm-
less set of types of allocation rule fθ ∈ F¯{ai,aj} that induces
the critical allocation hyperplane lfθ,{ai,aj}.
Proof. First notice that, since the allocation hyperplanes
in L{ai,aj} are parallel, the critical allocation hyperplane
lfθ,{ai,aj} divides the allocation hyperplanes in L{ai,aj} in
two sets, depending on which side of it they lie. For those
on the same side as the indifference hyperplane, the agent is
already getting its preferred type soH(θ, f) = Θ. For those
3By the previous sentence, we know that there exists a constant
c (equal to the payment difference) such that if ai · θ − c > aj · θ
then the agent receives ai and vice versa. This equation exactly
corresponds to a translation of the indifference hyperplane by c.
on the opposite side, the agent would rather report a type
yielding her preferred allocation, so H(θ, f) corresponds to
the open half-space containing the indifference hyperplane.
The intersection of all these sets is exactlyH(θ, fθ)
The previous lemma implies that, given θ and a set of
allocations A′ = {ai, aj}, the critical allocation hyper-
plane lfθ,A′ divides the space into two half-spaces, and
that if lfθ,A′ 6= IA′ , then the open half-space contain-
ing the indifference hyperplane corresponds to the harmless
set of types of F¯{ai,aj}, otherwise, if lfθ,A′ = IA′ , then
H(θ, F¯{ai,aj}) = H(θ, f
θ) = Θ.
Definition 9. Let F¯ θ = {fθ{ai,aj} : {ai, aj} ∈ A} be the set
of critical allocation rules given all pairs {ai, aj} ∈ A.
Definition 10. Let Lθ = {lfθ,{ai,aj} : {ai, aj} ∈ A} de-
note the set of critical allocation hyperplanes.
From Observation 1 and Lemma 1, follows Corollary 1,
which says that to identify the harmless set it suffices to
identify the critical allocation hyperplanes.
Corollary 1. H(θ, F¯ ) = H(θ, F¯ θ) = ∩fθ∈F¯ θH(θ, f
θ).
Figure 1(a) shows an example of a critical allocation hy-
perplane, indifference hyperplane, and harmless set of types
for a set of implementable-with-payments allocation rules
for the case with two allocations.
This example also provides a clear geometric expla-
nation for the phenomenon observed in previous work
that “symmetric” verifications (which tend to take the
form of a constraint that misreports must be local to the
true type) do not tend to help while “asymmetric” ones
do (Fotakis and Zampetakis 2015). Because θ is on the crit-
ical allocation hyperplane, there are arbitrarily close misre-
ports which can lead to a benefit for some allocation rules,
so restricting misreports to be close to the true type does not
help. In contrast, an asymmetric verification which rules out
the entire half space above the critical allocation hyperplane
is very useful.
More Than Two Allocations
Now that we understand how to identify harmless sets of
types of implementable-with-payments allocation rules with
two allocations, we can extend our analysis to cases with
more than two allocations. The key observation is that if a
type θ′ is not harmless then there exists an allocation rule
f and choice of a1 and a2 such that f(θ
′) = a1 while
f(θ) = a2 but θ · a1 > θ · a2. Since only these two allo-
cations are relevant, we can actually find an implementable-
with-payments allocation rule for which θ′ is not harmless
that only allocates a1 and a2, thus reducing to the case we
have already analyzed. To identify the harmless set when
there are more than two allocations, we thus intersect the
harmless sets resulting from each pair of allocations.
Theorem 1. Let F be the set of implementable-with-
payments allocation rules. H(θ, F ) = H(θ, F¯ θ).
Proof. Because F¯ θ ⊂ F , H(θ, F ) ⊂ H(θ, F¯ θ). For the
other direction, let θ′ be given such that θ′ 6∈ H(θ, F ). By
θ′
1
θ′
2
θ
(a)
θ′
1
θ′
2
θ
(b)
θ′
1
θ′
2
θ
(c)
θ′
1
θ′
2 θ
(d)
Figure 1: Harmless sets for individual pairs of allocations for types
with θ′∅ = 0 and their intersection (right graph).
Definition 1, θ′ /∈ H(θ, F ) if and only if there exists an
allocation rule f ∈ F such that θ · f(θ′) > θ · f(θ). By the
taxation principle, we can represent f by a list of allocations
and the price for each allocation. Construct f ′ from f by
eliminating all allocations except f(θ) and f(θ′) from this
list. Then f ′ is implementable-with-payments (those from
the list), f ′(θ) = f(θ), f ′(θ′) = f(θ′), and f ′ ∈ F¯ . Thus
θ′ 6∈ H(θ, F¯ ). By Corollary 1, θ′ 6∈ H(θ, F¯ θ).
Verification and Randomization
In this section, we examine the implications of allowing ran-
domization for implementing mechanisms using partial ver-
ification. We show that there is a significant harmless set
shared by all deterministic mechanisms. Since universally
truthful mechanisms are just distributions over deterministic
mechanisms, this turns out to be true for them as well. How-
ever, the harmless set shared by all truthful in expectation
mechanisms is quite limited.
Deterministic mechanisms
We now study how to identify the harmless set of types for
all truthful deterministic mechanisms. The result naturally
follows from Theorem 1. In particular, the harmless set is the
intersection of the harmless sets of all deterministic mecha-
nisms with two allocations, which in turn corresponds to the
intersections of the harmless sets generated by the relevant
critical allocation hyperplanes.
Theorem 2. Let F be the set of deterministic
implementable-with-payments allocation rules using
allocations in A. Then, H(θ, F ) corresponds to the inter-
section of the half-spaces generated by all lfθ,{ai,aj} ∈ L
θ
containing the origin.
Proof. First note that since the mechanisms here consid-
ered are deterministic there exists one allocation for each
possible assignment, i.e., A = {a1, a2, . . . , a|S|}. For ev-
ery pair of allocations {ai, aj} ∈ A the harmless set of
types H(θ, F¯{ai,aj}) can be computed as shown in Exam-
ple 1, i.e., H(θ, F¯{ai,aj}) = H(θ, f
θ) where H(θ, fθ) cor-
responds to the open half-spaces generated by lfθ,{ai,aj} ∈
Lθ that contains the origin. Thus, due to Corollary 1, to
compute H(θ, F¯ ), we need to consider only the alloca-
tion rules fθ ∈ F¯ θ where F¯ θ is the set of the critical al-
location hyperplanes, one for each {ai, aj} ∈ A. Given
this, Observation 1, and Theorem 1, we can conclude that
H(θ, F ) = H(θ, F¯ θ) = ∩fθ∈F θH(θ, f
θ).
We provide an example, shown in Figure 1, to illustrate
how to compute the harmless set of types for deterministic
mechanisms with more than two allocations.
Example 2. Consider a case with three assignments, one of
which is null with no value. Thus, we have assignments S =
{∅, 1, 2} and allocations A = {a1, a2, a3}. Without loss of
generality, assume that a1(∅) = 1, a2(1) = 1, and a3(2) =
1. Consequently, F¯ θ = {fθ{a1,a2}, f
θ
{a1,a3}
, fθ{a2,a3}}. The
harmless sets for these allocation rules are shown in Fig-
ures 1 (b), (c), and (a) respectively. Since H(θ, F¯ θ), given
by their intersection, is shown in Figure 1(d).
This example also illustrates a key point about implement-
ing the verifications found by our method: despite the infi-
nite type space and infinite set of allocation rules, we can
express the properties we need to verify in terms of a finite
number of halfspace constraints, which gives reason to be-
lieve they may be verifiable in practical situations.
Universally truthful mechanisms
As previously discussed, the harmless set for all univer-
sally truthful mechanisms is the same as for all determin-
istic mechanisms. We observe that every universally truthful
mechanism can be represented as a distribution over truthful
deterministic mechanisms, and every deterministic mecha-
nism is a universally truthful mechanism that chooses the
specific deterministic mechanism with probability 1.
Theorem 3. The harmless set of types H(θ, F ) of all sin-
gle agent universally truthful mechanisms is equal to the
harmless set of types of all single agent truthful determin-
istic mechanism.
Proof. By definition, in order to guarantee that a mechanism
M is universally truthful, we need to guarantee that every
deterministic mechanism M′ ∈ SM is incentive compati-
ble. This implies that the harmless set of a universally truth-
ful mechanism is equal to the intersection of the harmless
set of all the deterministic mechanisms in its support.
Now note that every deterministic mechanism M′ is a
universally truthful mechanism that randomizes over M′
with probability equal to 1. Thus, in order to compute the
harmless set of types of all mechanismM, we need to com-
pute the intersection of the harmless sets of types of all the
deterministic mechanisms.
A useful lemma
Before turning to our characterization for truthful in expec-
tation mechanisms, we prove a more general lemma that
considers cases with various sets of allocations. It is appli-
cable, for example, when modeling restrictions such as the
existence of a null allocation for which agents are known to
have value 0 (common in auction settings).
The lemma works in the case where the set of possible al-
locations is rich enough that differences between possible al-
locations form a linear space. In particular, we cannot have a
finite set of allocations, as we do in the deterministic setting.
The lemma states that in this rich setting, we can character-
ize the harmless set of types as those which can be expressed
as a scaling down of the true type, plus some vector which
is perpendicular to the space of allocation differences.
The intuition for the lemma is given in Figure 2. The first
few plots illustrate why, when the vector space of allocation
differences is the entire space, the harmless set of types are
only those which are scaled-down versions of the true type:
for all others we can find a critical allocation hyperplane for
which they are on the wrong side. Specifically, it is always
possible to identify a hyperplane that contains θ for which
the origin belongs to one half space and the type θ′ belongs
to the other half space, i.e., θ′ is not harmless, unless θ′ be-
longs to the segment that connects the origin to θ.
When this vector space becomes smaller, however, we
add “unenforceable” directions in the type space, as types
that differ only by a vector perpendicular to all allocation
differences cannot be separated by a critical allocation hy-
perplane. These unenforceable directions in turn expand the
set of harmless types. As an example, consider the a setting
with two assignments and an agent who is indifferent be-
tween them. Rather than the harmless set being just types
between the origin and θ, it is actually the entire space be-
cause the agent is indifferent among all possible allocations.
More generally, this phenomenon occurs any time an agent’s
value for two assignments is tied, even if there are others
over which she has a strict preference.
Lemma 2. LetA ⊆ Rm be a set of allocations and let type θ
be given. DefineA2θ = {(a, a
′) : a, a′ ∈ A, (a−a′) ·θ 6= 0}
to be the pairs of allocations that θ is not indifferent be-
tween, and Dθ = {λ(a − a′) : (a, a′) ∈ A2θ, λ ∈ R} to
be the set of scaled differences between such pairs of alloca-
tions. IfDθ is a linear subspace, thenH(θ, F ) = {λθ+d⊥ :
λ ≤ 1, d⊥ ∈ D⊥θ } ∩ Θ, where D
⊥
θ = {v ∈ R
m : ∀d ∈
Dθ, d · v = 0}. That is, the harmless types are those which
are “smaller than” θ, modulo directions not captured byDθ .
(Proof in Appendix).
Proof. First, we show sufficiency. Let θ′ = λθ + d⊥ for
λ ≤ 1, and let d = α(a′ − a) ∈ Dθ for α > 0. Without
loss of generality, let θ prefer a′ to a, so that θ · d > 0. Now
suppose for contradiction that f is some allocation rule such
that f(θ) = a but f(θ′) = a′, and consider the allocation
hyperplane ℓ between the a cell and a′ cell for f . By Obser-
vation 2, d is normal to this boundary, oriented toward the a′
cell. For θ to be in the a cell and θ′ in the a′ cell, we must
therefore have (θ′− θ) · d > 0. But θ′− θ = (1−λ)θ+ d⊥,
and thus (θ′ − θ) · d = (1− λ)θ · d+ d⊥ · d. Now note that
by assumption θ · d < 0 and 1 − λ ≥ 0, and by definition
d⊥ ·d = 0, so in fact (θ′−θ)·d ≤ 0, which is a contradiction.
Thus every such θ′ is harmless.
For necessity, first suppose θ′ = λθ + d⊥θ′ for λ > 1.
By definition of Dθ, we have some d = α(a
′ − a) ∈ Dθ
for which θ · d 6= 0; without loss of generality we take
θ · d > 0. Now consider the allocation rule f(θ′′) = a
if θ′′ · d ≤ θ · d and a′ otherwise. (One can check that f
is implementable-with-payments, as the cell boundary be-
tween a and a′ is perpendicular to d by construction, and
correctly oriented.4) Now we have f(θ) = a by construc-
4While this construction may appear to leverage tie breaking
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Figure 2: Harmless sets for randomized allocation rules. The dotted
line depicts the scaled versions of θ, {λθ : λ ∈ R}.
tion, and f(θ) · θ = a · θ < a′ · θ = f(θ′) · θ, implying that
θ′ is not harmless.
Now project θ and θ′ onto Dθ by writing θ = dθ + d
⊥
θ
and θ′ = dθ′ + d
⊥
θ′ for dθ, dθ′ ∈ Dθ, d
⊥
θ , d
⊥
θ′ ∈ D
⊥
θ . From
the above two cases, we may assume that dθ′ 6= λdθ for any
λ ∈ R. Thus, we may further project dθ′ onto dθ , writing
dθ′ = αdθ + d¯ for a nonzero orthogonal direction d¯: d¯ 6= 0,
d¯ · dθ = 0, and α ∈ R. Finally, take d = d¯ + ǫdθ for some
ǫ > 0 sufficiently small (to be determined).
As Dθ is a vector space, d ∈ Dθ, so we may write
d = λ(a′ − a) for some λ > 0 and some pair of alloca-
tions (a, a′) ∈ A2θ for which θ is not indifferent. Indeed, we
have d · θ = (d⊥θ + d¯ + ǫdθ) · dθ = ǫ‖dθ‖
2 > 0, so θ
prefers a′ to a. Now let f be the allocation function defined
by f(θ′′) = a if d · θ′′ ≤ d · θ and a′ otherwise. Clearly
f(θ) = a, so to show that θ′ is not harmless, it suffices to
show f(θ′) = a′. This follows from a simple calculation:
d · θ′ = d¯ · θ′ + ǫdθ · θ′ = d¯ · (αdθ + d¯ · d⊥θ′) + ǫdθ · θ
′ =
‖d¯‖2 + ǫdθ · θ′ > 0 for sufficiently small ǫ.
Truthful in expectation mechanisms
Our results for deterministic and universally truthful mech-
anisms are relatively positive, in that there is a significant
harmless set of types which do not require verification. For
truthful in expectation mechanisms however, our results are
much more negative. Essentially, the only types in the harm-
less set are those which are a scaling or translation by adding
the same constant to the value of each assignment of the
original type, except in the special case where the agent is
indifferent among two or more assignments, which adds ad-
ditional dimensions to the harmless set. For brevity, we state
the theorem for the case where no such indifferences exist.
Theorem 4. Let θ be such that θsi 6= θsj for all i and j and
m ≥ 3. The harmless set of types of all single agent truthful
in expectation mechanisms is {λθ + λ′1 : λ ≤ 1, λ′ ∈ R}.
Proof. Theorem 4 is merely a special case of Lemma 2 with
difference setDθ = {d ∈ Rm : d·1 = 0}. Consider the pos-
sible allocation differences in the setting of Theorem 4. We
can write this set as {α(p− q) : p, q ∈ ∆m, α ∈ R}, which
is all scaled differences of distributons over outcomes. But
this set is simply the affine hull of the probability simplex,
{d ∈ Rm : d · 1 = 1}, shifted so that it passes through
the origin, which is precisely the vector subspaceDθ above.
in f , it would hold just as well defining f(θ′′) = a if θ′′ · d <
z(1 + λ)/2 and a′ otherwise. Similarly, the remaining arguments
in the proof need not depend on how allocation rules break ties.
Applying Lemma 2 immediately gives the result, as here
D⊥θ = {0}. Finally, note that adding indifferences reduces
the dimension of Dθ and correspondingly increases the di-
mension ofD⊥θ , and thus the harmless set of types.
The proof follows from a Lemma 2 that encompasses the
case with indifferences as well as more general scenarios. A
direct intuition is shown in Figure 2. Parts (b) and (c) show
that we can find pairs of allocations where the critical al-
location hyperplane is arbitrarily close to the line between
θ and the origin. So, by considering the intersection of the
harmless types of all the possible pair of allocations, the re-
sulting harmless types must all be along this line. Part (a)
shows that types along the line from θ going away from the
origin are not harmless. When these figures are combined in
the full three dimensional type space, we gain an extra de-
gree of freedom as we can add a constant to the value for
each allocation without changing the incentives, resulting in
the harmless set illustrated in part (d).
Multi-Agent Mechanisms
As further motivation for our characterizations of the im-
plementability of all deterministic single-agent mechanisms
in Theorem 2, in this section, we discuss how to identify
an agent’s harmless set of types in multi-agent scenarios by
leveraging on the results presented in the previous sections.
Essentially, this boils down to a three step process:
1. Choose a truthful multi-agent mechanismMma.
2. Derive a set of corresponding single-agent allocation rules
Fsa which are implementable with payments.
3. CharacterizeH(θ, Fsa) for each single agent.
To illustrate this process, consider a scenario with n unit-
demand agents and two items, i1 and i2. Given this, the set
of possible assignments for each agent is S = {∅, i1, i2}.
Assume that the mechanismMma is the incentive compat-
ible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction (Vickrey 1961;
Clarke 1971; Groves 1973) that allocates items to agents
such that the social welfare is maximised and charges each
agent her externality. Thus, the allocation and the payment
of each agent depends on the types reported by the other
agents. The next step is to derive the corresponding single-
agent allocation rules Fsa. In the case of VCG, every single-
agent implementable-with-payments allocation rule fsa is
characterized by prices p1 and p2 for item i1 and i2, respec-
tively, which correspond to the agent’s externality. fsa then
assigns the agent the item (or nothing) she prefers at those
prices. One of the fsa characterized by prices p1 and ps is
shown in Figure 3(a) where it is possible to observe that if
the agent’s type is in the red area no item is allocated to the
agent, if it is in the blue area then she gets item i1, and if it is
in the green area she gets item i2. Without restrictions on the
types of the other agents, every non-negative pair of prices
p1 and p2 is possible, and thus this defines the set of single-
agent allocation rules Fsa. Because every pair of prices is
possible, we can immediately apply Theorem 2 for the final
step to characterize the harmless set.5
5Strictly speaking VCG is a family of mechanisms determined
by tie-breaking rules, our results apply to identify the set of types
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Figure 3: (a) Example of allocation rule fsa of single-agent mech-
anisms induced by a multi-agent mechanism where no item is allo-
cated to the agent whose type is in the red area, if it is in the blue
area then she gets item i1, and if it is in the green area she gets item
i2. (b, c, d) Examples of how the Harmless set of types changes for
different values of reserve prices r1 and r2 set by the mechanism.
Corollary 2. Let F denote the set of implementable-with-
payments deterministic allocation rules and let Fsa denote
the set of single-agent allocation rules derived from VCG.
ThenH(θ, F ) = H(θ, Fsa).
This three step process can be applied to any truthful
multi-agent mechanism. In general, step 2 is an applica-
tion of the taxation principle, and step 3 follows the logic
of the proof of Theorem 2. Some cases, such as affine
maximizers with finite agent weights and zero allocation
weights (Roberts 1979), yield the same result as VCG, but
others are more complex. For example, in the same setting
as before but with additional reserve prices r1 and r2, not ev-
ery set of prices is possible, because r1 and r2 serve as lower
bounds. Thus, the harmless set of types depends also on the
specific value of r1 and r2 as shown in Figure 3 (b,c,d).
Allocation-dependent verification
We have largely assumed that the set of verifiable types de-
pends only on the true type. Some authors assume, however,
that the set of verifiable types also depends on the allocation
received. For example, in the combinatorial auction setting
studied by Fotakis, Krysta and Ventre 2014, they assume that
the mechanism designer can only determine ex post whether
the agent over-reported her value for the assignment she re-
ceived.
Our techniques still provide insight in this more refined
setting. Figure 4 (a) shows both the harmless set (red) and
the additional types not verified by their verification (blue)
for the allocation rule that always assigns the agent her pre-
ferred assignment. They are able to verify fewer types and
still implement the allocation rule because, for this particular
allocation rule the agent does not benefit while the harmless
set satisfies the stronger condition that there is no rule under
which they would benefit. In fact our framework shows an
even weaker verification would suffice, as any type below
the horizontal line is harmless (see Figure 1 (c)).
Reverse approach
Our tools can be used also to answer the following question:
given a reported type θ′ ∈ Θ and a class of mechanisms,
what types need to be verified? In this case, the verification
that is simultaneously harmless for all tie-breaking rules.
aims to check if a type θˆ ∈ Θ is the true type of the agent.
Thus, from the perspective of the mechanism designer it is
unnecessary to verify whether θˆ is the agent’s true type, if
an agent with true type θˆ cannot benefit by reporting θ′. We
call the types that need to be verified harmful.
Definition 11. Given a reported type θ′ and an allocation
rule f , the harmful set of types Z(θ′, f) is the set composed
by the types θˆ ∈ Θ such that f(θ′) · θˆ > f(θˆ) · θˆ.
Now, we show how to straightforwardly adapt our formu-
lation to harmful sets of types. Let’s consider a particular
such f over two allocations with c = p1 − p2 and a type θ′.
There are four possible cases for Z(θ′, f).
Case 1: θ′ · a1 ≥ θ′ · a2 and f(θ′) = a1. An agent with
any true type θˆ ∈ Θ such that θˆ · a1 > θˆ · a2 and f(θˆ) = a2
can benefit by reporting θ′. Thus, such types are the ones in
the set Z(θ′, f) and corresponds to all and only the types
that belong to both the same half space as θˆ w.r.t. the indif-
ferent hyperplane and the opposite half space as θˆ w.r.t. the
allocation hyperplane.
Case 2: θ′ · a1 ≥ θ′ · a2 and f(θ′) = a2. No agent can
strictly benefit from reporting such a type θ′ because either
the agent prefers a1, and thus would be made worse off by
doing so, or the agent prefers a2 and so must already have
f(θ) = a2. Thus Z(θ
′, f) = ∅.
Case 3: θ′ · a1 ≤ θ′ · a2 and f(θ′) = a2. As in Case 1.
Case 4: θ′ · a1 ≤ θ′ · a2 and f(θ′) = a1. As in Case 2.
We now move to consider a set of allocation rules F . In-
terestingly, we can answer two slightly different versions of
the previous question. One is to identify the set of types
Z(θ′, F ) that are harmful for all the allocation rules in F ,
or the set of types Z¯(θ′, f) that are harmful for least one
allocation rule in F . Thus, the set Z(θ′, F ) is equal to the
intersection of Z(θ′, f), ∀f ∈ F , while Z¯(θ′, f) is equal
to the union of Z(θ′, f), ∀f ∈ F . These sets are shown in
Figure 4 (b) for Example 2. In this case, the set Z(θ′, F )
corresponds to the types that belong to the red area, while
Z¯(θ′, F ) includes also the types in the blue areas.
These two formulations can be thought of as upper and
lower bounding the verification needed respectively. The
Z(θ′, F ) formulation captures what needs to be verified us-
ing ordinary verification, which defines verifications solely
in terms of (θ, θ′) pairs. More refined versions of verifi-
cation, such as allocation-dependent verification, can po-
tentially verify fewer types by conditioning the verification
on the specific allocation rule. Thus, Z(θ′, F ) captures a
stronger notion of the types for whom reporting θ′ is strictly
better in every scenario. Such a lower bound could be used,
for example, to argue that there is no practical verification
in a particular scenario even if we include refined notions of
verification.
As mentioned before, we have chosen to present our pri-
mary approach as identifying the harmless set of types given
a set of agents, allocation rules, and agents’ true types be-
cause it leads to appealing geometrical characterization. The
reverse approach is more natural for direct application by a
mechanism designer because it is directly phrased in terms
of what to do for a given report. In particular, the steps the
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Figure 4: (a) Example of the harmless set of types for a particular
allocation when the verification is allocation-dependent. (b) Set of
types Z(θ′, F ) (red area) and set of types Z¯(θ′, F ) (red and blue
areas) for Example 2 (illustrated in Figure 1). (c) Single item auc-
tions: Set of harmful types Zk(θ
k′, fV CG, θ˜
k) (red area) for the
case in which θ˜k ≤ θk
′
; set of harmful types Zk(θ
k′, fV CG) (red
and blue areas).
designer has to follow to use verification as a substitute for
money are the following. First, the designer decides which
family of implementable-with-payments allocation rules to
use and collects the agents’ reported types. Then he verifies
that each agent’s true type is not in the set of types Z(θ′, F )
and, if necessary, penalizes the agents by, e.g., excluding
them in the allocation. Finally, he applies the chosen allo-
cation rule. The downside of the reverse approach is that the
geometric characterization is more complex. In the end how-
ever, the two are equivalent as all that matters is identifying
the set of (θ, θ′) pairs for which verification is needed.
Application examples
We conclude with three additional applications. First we
show an example of allocation dependent verification and
reverse approach applied to second price auctions. For k-
minded combinatorial auctions, we show that can recover
previous results about when a particular verification is or is
not sufficient and that we can extend them by characterizing
a verification that would be sufficient for the case where it
is not. ForK-facility location, we show how our framework
allows us to recover a sufficient verification for a particular
class of mechanisms and extend it to a much larger class.
Second price auctions
Consider the single item auction problem and the second
price auction mechanism whose allocation rule, denoted by
fSP , assigns the single item i to the agent k ∈ K with
the highest submitted bid θk
′
. From a single agent perspec-
tive, there are two possible assignments, namely S = {∅, i}.
Given this, a deterministic mechanism has two possible al-
locations, a1(∅) = 1 and a2(i) = 1. Here, we focus on the
reverse approachwith the aim to identify the set of types that
needs to be verified for both the allocation-dependent case
and non-allocation-dependent case (i.e., the one presented
at the beginning of the paper).
In the allocation-dependent case, the designer takes into
account fSP and observes the reported type θ
k′ for all k ∈
K , while the real type θk of agent k ∈ K is unknown. Note
that given any agent k ∈ K and the allocation rule fSP , only
the highest bid of agentsK \ k affect k’s single agent mech-
anism; denote such bid with θ˜k = max{θj
′
|j ∈ K \ k}, and
the single agent allocation rule that takes this information
into account with Zk(θ
k′, f θ˜
k
SP ). Given this, we can focus on
agent k’s single agent mechanism with threshold defined by
θˆk (as explained in theMulti-AgentMechanisms section). In
what follows, we focus on single agent mechanism and thus,
for the sake of simplicity, we remove the index k. In particu-
lar, we denote with Z(θ′, f θ˜SP ) agent k’s set of harmful types
given the allocation rule and the effect of the agents K \ k.
The set Z(θ′, f θ˜SP ) for the case in which θ˜ ≤ θ
′ corresponds
to the red area in Figure 4 (c). This set contains all the types
θˆ ∈ Θ such that f θ˜SP (θˆ) · θˆ < f
θ˜
SP (θ
′) · θˆ. Recall that for
the allocation-dependent case, the verification happens only
if the agent receives the item. Thus, Z(θ′, f θ˜SP ) = ∅ when
θ˜ > θ′.
In the non-allocation-dependent case the set Z(θ′, fSP )
is exactly as explained in the Reverse approach section and
corresponds to the red and blue areas in Figure 4 (c).
This example also highlights how easy is to compare dif-
ferent types of verification using our approach. Indeed, in
this case, Figure 4 (c) clearly illustrates how Z(θ′, fSP ) ⊇
Z(θ′, f θ˜SP ), and the scenarios in which this improvement is
significant.
k-minded combinatorial auctions
Consider the (known) k-minded combinatorial auction set-
ting studied by Fotakis, Krysta and Ventre 2014. In this set-
ting a set of goodsmust be allocated to a set of agents, and an
agent has some value for exactly k subsets of them. (More
precisely, she receives some set of items and her utility is
that of the most valuable of the k sets of which they are a
superset.) They showed that for k = 1, all implementable-
with-payments allocation rules are also implementable using
a verification that prevents agents from overbidding, while
for k > 2 this is not the case. This result follows easily from
our results, that also provide a nice visual intuition for what
goes wrong in the k = 2 case.
For k = 1, from a single agent perspective there are ef-
fectively two possible assignments, S = {s1, s2}: the agent
does not get her desired bundle θs1 = 0 or she does and
gets value θs2 . From Theorem 1 (deterministic mechanisms)
or Theorem 4 (randomized mechanisms), we see that the
harmless types are exactly those where the agents underbids.
Thus, being able to verify the agent did not overbid suffices.
For k = 2, we simply add a new assignment s3. Letting
θ2 = θs3 and θ1 = θs2 , Figure 1(a) shows the harmless set
for deterministic mechanisms with the s1 dimension omit-
ted as θs1 = 0. Again applying Theorem 1, the harmless set
no longer includes all types where the agent underbids. In
the example shown, the agent prefers s3 to s2, and so types
where the agent underbids on s3 but underbids more on s2
are not harmless. Thus, this is exactly the sort of misreport
that makes being able to verify that the agent has not overbid
insufficient. It also shows that a sufficient verification is that
the agent has correctly reported her value for her preferred
assignment and not overreported her value for the other as-
signment. (This can even be weakened to not overbidding on
the assignment received, and, if the agent receives her pre-
ferred assignment, that she additionally did not underbid her
value relative to the other assignment.) Whether this verifi-
cation is reasonable or not depends on the application.
For randomizedmechanisms, the technical Lemma 2 used
to prove Theorem 4 can be directly applied to yield the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 5. Let θ be such that θsi 6= θsj for all i and j
and m ≥ 3. The harmless set of all single agent truthful in
expectation mechanisms with θs1 = 0 is {λθ : λ ≤ 1}.
Proof. Apply Lemma 2 with the expanded Dθ = R
m (be-
cause the total probability of non-zero assignments can now
be less than one). Thus D⊥θ = {0} and the result fol-
lows.
Note that, in contrast to Theorem 4, adding a constant to
the value of each non-null allocation is no longer harmless
because it changes values relative to the null allocation.
K-facility location
Consider a set of G potential locations where a set of K
facilities will ultimately be located (|G| > |K|). Agents
will be assigned to one of the K facilities and have pref-
erences over the facility they are assigned to. In particu-
lar their utility for being assigned to the facility at loca-
tion g ∈ G is θg = b − cg where b is the benefit of us-
ing a facility and cg is the cost associated with using the
facility at location g. We study the resulting mechanism
design problem under the assumption that the mechanism
can enforce the assignment of an agent to a particular fa-
cility, an assumption called cluster imposing in the litera-
ture (Ferraioli, Serafino, and Ventre 2016). We can directly
apply Theorem 2 to characterize the verification needed to
ensure that all deterministic implementable-with-payments
allocation rules are truthful with this verification. At this
level of abstraction, Figure 1(a) captures the relevant pair-
wise constraints, and the overall harmless set is not substan-
tively different than in our analysis of VCG (which uses an
implementable-with-payments allocation rule for this prob-
lem) except that the null assignment is not permitted.
Our results become more interesting when we study the
restricted case where the agents and possible locations are
on a line and cg is the distance from the agent’s location to g.
This setting was previously studied by Ferraioli et al. (2016),
who showed that in addition to the cluster imposing assump-
tion, a combination of two (allocation dependent) verifica-
tions is sufficient to implement every efficient deterministic
mechanism (with fixed tie-breaking). The first, no underbid-
ding, ensures the agent cannot report that she is closer to
her assigned facility than she actually is. The second, direc-
tion imposing, ensures the agent cannot report she is to the
left of her assigned facility when she is actually to the right
(and vice versa). Because agent locations are restricted to be
on the line, agent types are quite restricted. When restrict-
ing to the pairwise case, if (WLOG) the agent prefers the
right location, the harmless set for all implementable-with-
payments allocation rules consists of all types to the left of
the agent along the line. If the agent’s location is in between
the two possible facility locations, then their two verifica-
tions exactly cover the complement of the harmless set: no
underbidding prevents reports to the right of the agent’s lo-
cation but left of the facility location while direction impos-
ing prevents reports to the right of the facility location. If the
agent is located to the right of both facilities, neither verifi-
cation prevents misreports further to the right. Instead, the
restriction to allocation rules which use fixed tie-breaking
ensures that these reports never change the allocation, so the
harmless set in this case is actually the entire space.
In addition to providing an intuitive illustration of why
their verifications are sufficient (and in a sense necessary
as well), we can strengthen their characterization to cover
a larger class of mechanisms. In particular, let a fixed tie-
breaking implementable-with-payments allocation rule be
an implementable-with-payments allocation rule with the
additional property that all types which are indifferent be-
tween two allocations at prices implied by the allocation rule
receive the same allocation.
Corollary 3. In the cluster imposing case, the no under-
bidding and direction imposing verifications suffice to im-
plement all (efficient and approximate) fixed tie-breaking
implementable-with-payments allocation rules.
We can also shed more light on whether their veri-
fications are necessary. They show that eliminating any
one of them breaks truthfulness, which our results suc-
cintly illustrated. However, their verifications are stronger
than necessary in that they are still applied in the
case where the agent would already receive her pre-
ferred allocation by reporting truthfully (and so the harm-
less set is the entire space). So in principle the ver-
ifications could be weakened to no-underbidding-when-
not-receiving-preferred-allocation and direction-imposing-
when-not-receiving-preferred-allocation respectively.
Conclusion
We have introduced a general methodology that can be used
to identify the harmless set of types. Knowing this set helps a
mechanism designer identify the assumptions needed in or-
der to use partial verification as a substitute for money in a
new domain. We have pointed out that the power of verifica-
tion depends on the class of mechanisms considered: in the
case of deterministic and universally truthful mechanisms
the harmless set of types is usually significantly larger than
in case of truthful in expectation mechanisms. Furthermore,
we discuss two possible extensions to our results: allocation-
dependent verification and the reverse approach. We con-
clude with examples showing how our approach can be used
in three application domains and how our results replicate
and extend existing results in the literature.
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